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Abstract
Healthy nutrition promotions and regulations have long been re-
garded as a tool for increasing social welfare. One of the avenues taken
in the past decade is sugar consumption regulation by introducing a
sugar tax. Such a tax increases the price of extensive sugar contain-
ment in products such as soft drinks. In this article we consider a
typical problem of optimal regulatory policy design, where the task
is to determine the sugar tax rate maximizing the social welfare. We
model the problem as a sequential game represented by the three-
level mathematical program. On the upper level, the government
decides upon the tax rate. On the middle level, producers decide
on the product pricing. On the lower level, consumers decide upon
their preferences towards the products. While the general problem is
computationally intractable, the problem with a few product types is
polynomially solvable, even for an arbitrary number of heterogeneous
consumers. This paper presents a simple, intuitive and easily imple-
mentable framework for computing optimal sugar tax in a market with
a few products types. This resembles the reality as the soft drinks, for
instance, are typically categorized in either regular or no-sugar drinks,
e.g. Coca-Cola and Coca-Cola Zero. We illustrate the algorithm using
an example based on the real data and draw conclusions for a specific
local market.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
07
24
3v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  1
6 O
ct 
20
18
Keywords: Three-level mathematical program, nutrition promotion, social
welfare optimization, governmental regulations, enumeration algorithms
1 Introduction
Since the 2000s, interest in the proper nutrition promotion has dramatically
increased in many countries. According to the World Health Organization
(WHO), worldwide obesity has nearly tripled since 1975. In 2016, more than
1.9 billion adults were overweight, with over 650 million of these adults being
obese. Moreover, 41 million children under the age of 5 were overweight or
obese in 2016 [FAO and WHO, 2017]. In addition to obesity, adults, children
and adolescents often face risks such as depletion, stunted growth, lack of
vitamins and minerals, nutritional non-communicable diseases (heart disease,
stroke, diabetes, certain cancers) that affect their health in the short and long
term periods [FAO and WHO, 2017]. Therefore, the formation of a proper
nutrition culture is very important, especially in youth, since all the human
habits and life values are formed at a young age [Ferreira et al., 2007]. During
adolescence, young people adjust their lifestyle easier than adults. Thereby,
nutrition habit is one of the basic elements for their health in future.
Solving obesity problems is also a challenging task for the governments,
as inadequate nutrition increases health care costs, reduces productivity and
slows economic growth. These consequences, in turn, are the basis for per-
manent poverty and poor population health [FAO and WHO, 2017].
In contrast, the main concern of the companies is the average market share
and/or profit [Smith et al., 2013]. This incentives are not always directed at
healthy products, and it is always a challenge for a government to introduce
and to maintain mechanisms stimulating the companies to promote proper
nutrition. Clearly, there might exist opposing interests, when the companies
focus on purely financial indicators, while the government seeks to improve
the social welfare. In this interaction, the end-consumers play crucial role.
On the one hand, consumers choose products guided by various market-
ing stimuli such as advertising, pricing, and branding [Solomon et al., 2012].
This way consumers strongly support the companies. On the other hand, the
governmental and societal information provision programs create awareness
of proper nutrition importance, shift the demand towards healthy products
and, as a result, customer valuations for healthy products become higher than
for unhealthy ones. This way consumers strongly support the government.
Therefore, a combination of information provision and direct regulations,
e.g. extra taxation for unhealthy products, is a powerful instrument of the
government to improve the social welfare.
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1.1 Nutrition promotion instruments
In this section we describe possible nutrition promotion mechanisms for a gov-
ernment and for a company/firm. Later, some of the mechanisms, namely,
taxes and prices, will be explicitly introduced as variables in the utility func-
tions of the companies and consumers, respectively.
The government is typically the first mover which sets monetary and/or
non-monetary product/market regulations. Among monetary regulations,
the most popular ones are taxes (for unhealthy products), subsidies (for
healthy products), and caps (maximal price for a product). These regula-
tions directly influence the utility function of a company and rarely affect the
consumer utility functions. Furthermore, government can use non-monetary
instruments to stimulate nutrition consumption, e.g., certification, label-
ing, obligatory description of ingredients and nutritional value on the pack-
ages [Stevenson and Ingwersen, 2012, Minkov et al., 2015]. More specifically,
the government can impose an obligation on firms to use particular size, color
and shape for nutritious food packages or for price tags. For instance, recent
research shows that the consumers perceive products in vivid packaging as
less healthy than food in muted color packages [Mead and Richerson, 2018].
Minimal font size of ingredients’ inscription and nutritional value also can
be used by government as non-monetary regulation. This tool may attract
consumers’ attention on containment of harmful to health ingredients such
as sugar, preservatives and dyes. The last but not the least tool is point-
of-sales merchandising. One study showed that joint presentation of healthy
and unhealthy products forces consumers to choose the first one because such
way increases guilt and the difficulty of social justification [Okada, 2005].
Consequently, merchandising can be an effective instrument which may force
people to buy healthy products. These non-monetary regulatory mechanisms
serve for information provision and do have influence on the consumer utility
functions, though the effect of the information provision is sometimes is not
immediate. The company utility functions are rarely directly affected by the
non-monetary governmental regulations.
In turn, a company/firm (producer or retailer) is the follower. Know-
ing the governmental regulations, companies maximize the profit applying
their toolkit to influence the consumer behavior. It should be noted that
interests of producers and retailers can be different, but within the frame-
work of this research we do not distinguish these two players. It is widely
accepted that the most powerful tool of a firm is the price set for a prod-
uct. Next to the price, discounts is the most popular instrument. To illus-
trate the possible efficiency of this tool, prior research has provided results
of experiments where price reduction can be a reason of increased consump-
3
tion [Geliebter et al., 2013, Ball et al., 2015]. For example, [Ball et al., 2015]
have found that a 20% discount for fruit and vegetables categories caused
increased purchasing per household of 35% for fruit and 15% for vegeta-
bles. Furthermore, it is proved that even temporary discounts can stim-
ulate proper nutrition consumption. In one study [Geliebter et al., 2013],
there were three periods (baseline - no discount, intervention - 50% dis-
count, follow-up - no discount) during which obese respondents were buying
fruits and vegetables during this periods. As a result, purchasing of fruits
and vegetables during follow-up period became higher than during baseline.
This research demonstrates effectiveness of applying discounts to increase
proper nutrition consumption. At the same time, firms may use such non-
monetary instruments as availability in stores, merchandising, and package
design [Glanz et al., 2012]. Availability in stores means that wide access
to proper nutrition food increase nutrition consumption. It happens be-
cause people prefer to buy what is in every supermarket instead of trying
to find something special for everyday meals [Desai and Ratneshwar, 2003,
Morales, 2005]. Merchandising was already discussed in the context of the
governmental tools and it can also be effective on the company’s level. More-
over, unusual packages can be used by marketers to increase demand for
proper nutrition [Rettie and Brewer, 2000].
1.2 Problem statement and basic assumptions
In this study we assume that (1) effective information provision programs
take place; (2) consumers are aware of proper nutrition importance; and (3)
consumers already formed their utility functions (product valuations) and in
the near future they are not going to change their preferences significantly.
Notice, without these assumptions the efficiency of direct regulations is ques-
tionable. We take the consumer utility functions as granted. This is also a
valid assumption, given a number and variety of consumer behavior models
available in the literature. In the end of the paper, we provide an insight-
ful example and analysis based on a specific consumer behavior model and
actual purchase data. Such data can be routinely obtained from the market
research agencies such as Nielsen, GfK and Kantar. We base our example
and experiments on the data provided by the latter party.
Specifically targeting the optimal regulations of the soft drinks markets,
this research focuses on the most popular, powerful and long-run instruments
of the government and of the firm, namely on the sugar tax and prices,
respectively. In the past decade, many countries initiated sugar consumption
regulation by introducing a sugar tax. Such a tax increases the price of
extensive sugar containment in products such as soft drinks. In this article
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we consider a typical problem of optimal regulatory policy design, where
the task is to determine the sugar tax rate maximizing the social welfare.
We model the problem as a sequential game represented by the three-level
mathematical program. On the upper level, given the utility functions of the
soft drink producer/retailer and consumers, the government decides upon the
sugar tax rate with the goal to optimize the social welfare. On the middle
level, given the sugar tax rate and the utility functions of the consumers,
a company decides on the product prices maximizing the company utility.
On the lower level, given the product prices, consumers decide upon their
preferences towards either sugar containing or sugar-free products. All utility
functions and the social welfare are taken from the classic economic literature.
This ensures the generality of the approach and applicability to not only the
soft drinks markets and sugar taxes, but rather to a broad variety of the
markets needing governmental regulations.
1.3 Contemporary sugar tax practices
The sugar tax means each liter of sugary drink will have an extra tax charge
up to 50%, depending on how much sugar is in the drink1. Tax rates depend
on government policy in a country and can be expressed in percentage or in
monetary units. Moreover, taxation schemes vary from country to country,
see Table 1. Nowadays, there are two common schemes: a one-level tax rate
and a multi-level tax rate. In the case of a one-level tax rate, government
establishes a single tax rate for all drinks containing sugar, or for drinks with
a sugar containment above a specific threshold. Such approaches are used
in France, Chile, Mexico, Belgium, Colombia, India, Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
UAE, USA, South Africa. Alternatively, several countries (e.g. Thailand,
Ireland, UK) apply a multi-level taxation scheme, which assumes different
tax rates according to sugar content2, see Table 1.
In this paper we assume a one-level tax rate for any positive sugar contain-
ment in the drink. This is the current sugar tax practice in many countries,
e.g., France, Mexico, Belgium, Colombia, India, Saudi Arabia, UAE and
USA.The approach is straightforwardly extendable to a multi-level tax rate
with a constant number of (a few) levels.
1https://www.bbc.com/news/health-35824071
2https://www.beveragedaily.com/Article/2017/12/20/Sugar-taxes-The-global-picture-
in-2017
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Country Tax rate Effective
since
France 7.53 euro per 100 liters 2013
Chile > 6, 25 grams of sugar per 0.1 liter → 16% 2014
Mexico 1 peso per liter 2014
Belgium 3.7284 euro per 100 liters 2013
Colombia 20% per liter 2016
India 40% 2017
Portugal > 80 grams of sugar per liter → 16% 2017
Thailand 14% + 5-stage sugar tax according to 2017
sugar content
Saudi Arabia 50% 2017
UAE 50% 2017
USA (several cities) 12 cents per ounce 2017
Ireland 58 grams of sugar per 0.1 liter → 21 cents;
> 8 grams of sugar per 0.1 liter → 31 cents 2018
South Africa > 4 grams of sugar per 0.1 liter → 2.1 cents
per gram of sugar per 0.1 liter 2018
UK 58 grams of sugar per 0.1 liter → 18%;
> 8 grams of sugar per 0.1 liter→ 24% 2018
Table 1: Sugar tax rates across countries
2 Definitions and mathematical model
Since the tax per cent varies widely from country to country, it makes sense to
develop a general mathematical model determining the taxation mechanism
maximizing the social welfare. Such a model should coordinate the interests
across the three players: government, firms and consumers. As a starting
point for the model the utility functions of the players are defined. The gov-
ernment utility is usually understood as social welfare, see [Bernoulli, 2011].
Let the social welfare be referred as W . It is expressed as the total utility of
consumers and firms plus the tax:
W = Uc + Uf + T,
where Uc is the total utility of all consumers, Uf is the total utility of all
firms, and T is the total tax collected.
The total utility of the consumers Uc is defined as follows. Let the set
of consumers be denoted by N . For simplicity of presentation, consider a
market with only two products: one is containing sugar and another one
is sugar-free. Let the product containing sugar be indexed with 1, and the
sugar-free product be indexed with 0, and let M = {0, 1} be the product
index set. Later we explain how to generalize the model and how to adjust
the algorithms in the case of several (a constant number of) products. Let
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ui,j be an individual utility of consumer i ∈ N for product j ∈M , and let xi,j
be a binary decision variable taking value 1 if consumer i prefers product j
to any other products and 0 otherwise. Assuming consumer’s rationality, we
have xi,k = 1, i ∈ N, k ∈M , if only if ui,k = maxj∈M ui,j and ui,k ≥ 0. Here,
for all consumers i ∈ N we assume that ∑j∈M xi,j ≤ 1. For this assumption
to be true, the ties on the maximal utilities are broken in favor of the company
revenue — this is also a folklore economic assumption. Clearly, if a consumer
has negative utilities for all products, she does not purchase anything, i.e.,∑
j∈M xi,j = 0.
In the literature on marketing, there are various models describing be-
havior and individual utilities of the consumers for a product. Vast majority
of the models are linear in the product price. For instance, consumer utility
function suggested in [Holtrop et al., 2017] consists of (1) a constant which
includes different psychological, economical, and sociological factors such as
brand loyalty, consumer’s budget, readiness to pay etc; (2) a term depending
on the number of claims and nutritional values which are written on product
packages, e.g., labels as ”low in fat”, ”high in fiber” and other which may
influence consumer’s choice; and (3) deduction of the price related factor:
ui,j =
(
βi,j + β1 ·NrClaims+ β2 ·NutrV al − β3 · pj
)+
.
Here, βi,j, β1, β2, β3 are the coefficients determined by a multinominal choice
model3, NrClaims is the average number of claims on product packages in
category, NutrV al is the average nutritional value in category, and pk is the
price of product j. Notice, the intercept βi,j is a constant including factors
causing heterogeneity across the consumers. Finally,
Uc =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
ln(1 + ui,j) · xi,j,
under a classic assumption of diminishing marginal utilities of consumers,
see, e.g., [Bernoulli, 2011].
The consumer behavior model in [Holtrop et al., 2017] does not assume
price elasticity of the demand. This is a reasonable assumption for the present
research as for the soft drinks, the volume of purchase depends rather on
the preferences and demographic characteristics of the consumer’s household
than on the product price. Therefore, we may assume that the demand of a
consumer i ∈ N is given in two quantities: if the consumer prefers sugar-free
drink, the realized demand is Di,0, and if the sugary drink is preferred, the
3https://eml.berkeley.edu/books/choice2.html
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demand is Di,1. Then, the utility of a company Uf is defined by its revenue
Uf =
(∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
Di,j · pj · xi,j
)
− T,
while the tax T is defined by
T = α ·
∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p1 · xi,1,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is the sugar tax rate established by the government.
Thus, the entire mathematical model is represented by the three-level
program:
max
0≤α≤1
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(
ln(1 + ui,j) + Di,j · p∗j
) · x∗i,j (1)
subject to
p∗ = arg max
p≥0
(∑
i∈N
Di,0 · p0 · x∗i,0
)
+ (1− α) ·
(∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p1 · x∗i,1
)
(2)
subject to
x∗ = arg max
x
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
ui,j · xi,j (3)
subject to
ui,j =
(
βi,j + β1 ·NrClaims+ β2 ·NutrV al − β3 · pj
)+
, (4)∑
j∈M
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N, (5)
xi,j ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N, j ∈M. (6)
On the first level, the government decides upon the sugar tax rate 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
to maximize the social welfare. On the second level, given the tax rate α, the
company decides on the prices p0 ≥ 0 and p1 ≥ 0 to maximize the company’s
revenue. On the third level, given the prices p, the consumers select preferred
products maximizing their utility.
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3 Solution of the three-level program
In this section we provide intuition and sketch the algorithms solving the
three-level mathematical problem (1)-(6). Then, we present the formal pseudo-
codes of the algorithms. As the algorithms are rather straightforward and
very intuitive, we leave it for a reader to prove their correctness.
To find the optimal tax rate, we first suggest to find all potentially optimal
pricing strategies of the company. Notice, the consumer utility functions are
linear in prices. Therefore, for every consumer i ∈ N , the preference half-
spaces are determined by inequalities βi,0 − β3p0 ≥ βi,1 − β3p1, where the
consumer prefers the sugar-free drink, and βi,0 − β3p0 ≤ βi,1 − β3p1, where
the consumer might prefer the sugary drink. The indifference hyperplane
βi,0−β3p0 = βi,1−β3p1 does, actually, represent the prices where the consumer
is indifferent which product to purchase. Next to indifference hyperplanes,
let us introduce the budget hyperplanes : βi,0 = β3p0 and βi,1 = β3p1, as
the consumer purchases a product only if her utility for the product is non-
negative, i.e., βi,0 ≥ β3p0 or βi,1 ≥ β3p1. The union of all indifference and
budget hyperplanes splits the price space in many polyhedras. Let us refer
to a polyhedra as a choice region if the interior of the polyhedra is not
intersected by any of the indifference or budget hyperplanes.
By construction, for all consumers, their preferences for a product remain
the same for any prices taken from the same choice region. Then, by linearity
of the revenue function in prices, only vertices of the choice regions might
become optimal pricing strategies of the company. Therefore, having O(n)
indifference and budget hyperplanes for only two products, where n is the
number of consumers, we may have at most O(n2) potentially optimal pricing
strategies. When the number of products increases to m, the number of
potentially optimal strategies increases to O(nm). Thus, keeping m a small
constant, brute-force enumeration of potentially optimal pricing strategies
remains polynomial and can be efficiently implemented. Moreover, since the
consumer utilities are independent on the sugar tax, for any choice of the tax
rate, one of the computed pricing strategies will be optimal. Hence, the first
step towards the optimal policy design is computing all potentially optimal
prices, which is done by Algorithm 1 below.
Given a set of potentially optimal pricing strategies of the company, it is
possible to compute the optimal sugar tax rate. Since the number of pricing
strategies and, consequently, the number of consumer responses is finite, the
social welfare function is a staircase function in α with break points possible
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Algorithm 1 Computing potentially optimal prices
1: Input: NrClaims, NutrV al, β1, β2, β3, βi,j for all i ∈ N, j ∈ {0, 1}
2: P := ∅ . Set of potentially optimal prices
3: Create a list B of budget hyperplanes: β3 · pj = βi,j + β1 ·NrClaims+ β2 ·NutrV al
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, 1}
4: Create a list I of indifference hyperplanes: βi,0 − β3 · p0 = βi,1 − β3 · p1 for all i ∈ N
5: for h ∈ B ∪ I do
6: for h′ ∈ B ∪ I such that h′ 6= h do
7: Compute prices p = h ∩ h′
8: P := P ∪ p
9: Output: P
only in the break-evens of the company’s revenue:(∑
i∈N
Di,0 · p′0 · x′i,0
)
+ (1− α) ·
(∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p′1 · x′i,1
)
=
(∑
i∈N
Di,0 · p′′0 · x′′i,0
)
+ (1− α) ·
(∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p′′1 · x′′i,1
)
,
where p′ and p′′ are two potentially optimal pricing strategies, and x′ and
x′′ are the respective consumer choices. Evaluating the social welfare in
every break point, and choosing for α the break point that maximizes the
social welfare does solve the three-level mathematical program. We call this
procedure Algorithm 2. Overall complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(n2m) for
n consumers and m products, which is still polynomial if the number of
products m is fixed.
Notice, the approach remains polynomial even for the multi-level sugar
taxes if the number of levels L is also fixed. In this case, one has to determine
not a single optimal α, but an optimal set of 2L− 1 parameters: L tax levels
and L − 1 sugar containment percentages where the tax jumps from one
level to another. A break-even for the company’s revenue is computed then
similarly to the computation of the vertices of the choice regions in the price
space, but now it is a vertex in the regulatory space R2L−1+ , where the revenues
of 2L potentially optimal pricing strategies meet each other. The overall time
complexity of the algorithm in this case is O(n2mL), which is still polynomial
in the input size.
4 Illustrative intuitive example
The following example describes the process of obtaining an optimal sugar
tax rate from the purchase data set. For simplicity of presentation, consider
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Algorithm 2 Computing optimal sugar tax rate
1: Input: P from Algorithm 1, Di,j for all i ∈ N, j ∈ {0, 1}
2: α∗ := 0 . Optimal sugar tax rate
3: for p ∈ P do
4: for i ∈ N do
5: if ui,0(p) ≥ ui,1(p) then
6: xi,0(p) = 1 and xi,1(p) = 0
7: else
8: xi,1(p) = 1 and xi,0(p) = 0
9: if maxj∈{0,1} ui,j < 0 then xi,0(p) = 0 and xi,1(p) = 0
10: W ∗ := maxp∈P Uc(p, x(p)) + Uf (p, x(p)) . Optimal social welfare
11: for p′ ∈ P do
12: for p′′ ∈ P do
13: Compute 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 such that
∑
i∈N
Di,0 · p′0 · xi,0(p′)
 + (1− α) ·
∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p′1 · xi,1(p′)
 =
∑
i∈N
Di,0 · p′′0 · xi,0(p′′)
 + (1− α) ·
∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p′′1 · xi,1(p′′)

14:
p(α) := argmax
p∈P
∑
i∈N
Di,0 · p0 · xi,0(p) + (1− α) ·
∑
i∈N
Di,1 · p1 · xi,1(p)
15:
W (α) :=
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈M
(ln(1 + ui,j(p(α))) +Di,j · pj(α)) · xi,j(p(α))
16: if W (α) ≥W ∗ then α∗ = α and W ∗ :=W (α)
17: Output: α∗ and W ∗
a market with two basic products, say Coca-Cola (j = 1) and Coca-Cola
Zero (j = 0), where the first one contains sugar and the second one is sugar-
free. For a generalization of this case one may consider two generic types
of products and deal with the averages per product type. Given a purchase
data set and applying multinomial choice model [Holtrop et al., 2017], we
obtain utility functions for three types of consumers, see Table 2.
When all budget and indifference lines/hyperplanes are drawn in the price
space (R2 in our case), we obtain the diagram as depicted in Figure 1. The
crossing points of the budget and indifference lines are the potential opti-
mal pricing strategies of the company (Coca-Cola). Having three lines per
consumer, we have nine lines in total, which might lead to at most 36 cross-
ings, which will be the output of Algorithm 1. However, not all pairs of
the lines cross each other, e.g., the budget lines for a product are parallel.
This shrinks the number of potentially optimal pricing strategies to 27 points
listed in Table 3 together with consumer preferences (“CC” stands for Coca-
Cola and “Z” stands for Coca-Cola Zero), realized utilities of consumers
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Coca-Cola Coca-Cola Zero
(H)igh sugar uH,1 = (0.94− 0.2p1)+ uH,0 = (0.41− 0.26p0)+
consumers
(like sugar)
(M)edium sugar uM,1 = (0.17− 0.18p1)+ uM,0 = (0.47− 0.24p0)+
consumers
(indifferent to sugar)
(L)ow sugar uL,1 = (0.53− 0.23p1)+ uL,0 = (0.93− 0.17p0)+
consumers
(do not like sugar)
Table 2: Consumer preferences in soft drinks with different sugar content
and respective company revenues. In the case at hands, “Low” consumers
have demand 11441 units, “Medium” consumers have demand 9433 units,
and “High” consumers have demand 9942 units independent on the product
(Regular or Zero). This allows us to compute the revenue of the company for
every potentially optimal pricing strategy. As an intermediate result, we ob-
tain that if the sugar tax rate α = 0, then the maximal revenue is 1093019.67
currency units (CU) in the following point: Coca-Cola is priced at 4.7 CU
and Coca-Cola Zero is priced at 5.47 CU.
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Figure 1: Price space
Now, we are ready to calculate the optimal sugar tax rate 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
We compute all break points of the social welfare as described in Algorithm
2. For instance, take a pair of pricing strategies, say, 9 and 13: pricing
strategy 9 is defined by p′1 = 0.94 and p
′
0 = 1.96, and pricing strategy 13
is defined by p′′1 = 2.13 and p
′′
0 = 1.58. In point 9, “High” and “Medium”
consumers purchase Coca-Cola while “Low” consumer buys Zero. In point
13, “High” consumer purchases Coca-Cola, and “Medium” joins “Low” in
her preference to Zero. The break-even in revenue under these two pricing
strategies is achieved with α being a solution to the equation:
11441 · 1.96 + (1−α) · (9433 + 9942) · 0.94 = (11441 + 9433) · 1.58 + (1−α) · 9942 · 2.13,
13
Nr Coordinates High sugar Medium sugar Low sugar Revenue
1 (0; 1.25) CC : u = 0.94 CC : u = 0.17 Z : u = 0.72 14301.25
2 (0; 1.58) CC : u = 0.94 CC : u = 0.17 Z : u = 0.66 18076.78
3 (0; 1.96) CC : u = 0.94 CC : u = 0.17 Z : u = 0.6 22424.36
4 (0; 2.35) CC : u = 0.94 CC : u = 0.17 CC : u = 0.53 0
5 (0; 5.47) CC : u = 0.94 CC : u = 0.17 CC : u = 0.53 0
6 (0.44; 1.58) CC : u = 0.85 CC : u = 0.09 Z : u = 0.66 26601.78
7 (0.94; 0) CC : u = 0.75 Z : u = 0.47 Z : u = 0.93 9345.48
8 (0.94; 1.58) CC : u = 0.75 Z : u = 0.0.9 Z : 0.66 42326.4
9 (0.94; 1.96) CC : u = 0.75 CC : u = 0 Z : 0.6 40636.86
10 (0.94; 3.62) CC : u = 0.75 CC : u = 0 CC : 0.31 28967.04
11 (0.94; 5.47) CC : u = 0.75 CC : u = 0 CC : u = 0.31 28967.04
12 (2.13; 0) CC : u = 0.51 Z : u = 0.47 Z : u = 0.93 21176.46
13 (2.13; 1.58) CC : u = 0.51 Z : u = 0.09 Z : u = 0.66 54157.38
14 (2.13; 1.96) CC : u = 0.51 Z : u = 0 Z : u = 0.6 62089.5
15 (2.13; 2.85) CC : u = 0.51 Z : u = 0.45 53783.31
16 (2.13; 5.47) CC : u = 0.51 CC : u = 0.04 45545.79
17 (2.65; 0) CC : u = 0.41 Z : u = 0.47 Z : u = 0.93 26346.3
18 (4.7; 0) Z : u = 0.41 Z : u = 0.47 Z : u = 0.93 0
19 (4.7; 1.58) CC : u = 0 Z : u = 0.09 Z : u = 0.66 79708.32
20 (4.7; 1.96) CC : u = 0 Z : u = 0 Z : u = 0.6 87640.44
21 (4.7; 4.78) CC : u = 0 Z : u = 0.12 101415.38
22 (4.7; 5.47) CC : u = 0 Z : u = 0 109309.67
23 (4.7; 8.7) CC : u = 0 46727.4
24 (5.19; 1.96) Z : u = 0 Z : u = 0.6 4913.04
25 (5.63; 5.47) Z : u = 0 62582.27
26 (9.75; 5.47) Z : u = 0 62582.27
27 (16.31; 5.47)
Table 3: All potentially optimal points
where the left hand side addresses the revenue at point 9 and the right
hand side addresses the revenue at point 13. The solution to the equation is
α = 4.62, which is beyond the global upper bound of 1 for the tax rate. Thus,
this break point can be disregarded. We perform the same calculations for all
pairs of the potentially optimal pricing strategies and derive all potentially
optimal tax rates α in interval [0, 1]. We list all these potentially optimal tax
rates in Table 4.
0.00 0.09 0.10 0.121 0.124 0.13 0.15
0.15 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.32
0.37 0.38 0.46 0.49 0.511 0.513 0.514
0.52 0.53 0.54 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63
0.69 0.7 0.61 0.83 0.84 0.97 1.00
Table 4: All potentially optimal tax rates α
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For each potentially optimal tax rate, we calculate the company’s maxi-
mal utility (revenue minus tax) by enumerating over all potentially optimal
pricing strategies. In the case at hands, for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the maximal
utilities of the company appear only in three price points: (22) Coca-Cola
is priced at 4.7 CU, Coca-Cola Zero is priced at 5.47 CU; (25) Coca-Cola
is priced 5.63 CU, Coca-Cola Zero is priced at 5.47 CU; (26) Coca-Cola is
priced at 9.75 CU, Coca-Cola Zero is priced at 5.47 CU. Moreover, points
25 and 26 are optimal only in α = 0, while point 22 is optimal on the entire
interval [0; 1].
Enumerating over all potentially optimal tax rates listed in Table 4, we
derive that the maximum social welfare of 156037 CU is achieved with α = 1,
when the company sets the prices 4.7 CU for Coca-Cola and 5.47 CU for
Coca-Cola Zero.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model for coordinating the interests of the gov-
ernment, companies and heterogeneous consumers. The model is based on
a sequential game represented by a three-level mathematical program. We
design an algorithm efficiently solving the program, i.e., obtaining a socially
optimal solution in time polynomial in the input size of the problem.
Surprisingly, for the case known in the literature [Holtrop et al., 2017], we
obtain that the optimal sugar tax rate maximizing the commonly used social
welfare function is equal to 100%. Furthermore, the real prices for Coca-
Cola and Coca-Cola Zero are greatly underestimated compared to the prices
that maximize the company (Coca-Cola) revenue. Moreover, the revenue
maximizing prices with and without taxation are exactly the same. This
phenomena might be caused by either oversimplification of the social welfare
function, or by oversimplification of the consumer behavior model, or by
inefficiency in the market caused by irrationality of the players, e.g., firms
underpricing their products, or by a combination of the above factors. In this
way, the approach proposed in the paper can be used in different contexts in
order to benchmark the social welfare and also in order to check reasonability
of the models/utilities of the players.
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